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2Abstract
The present study addresses children’s performance on the ‘faux pas’ test of social under-
standing. Based on previous tasks reported in Baron-Cohen et al. (1999) and Banerjee (2000),
a computer interface was used to administer a new version that required children to answer
forced-choice questions about four hypothetical stories involving unintentional insults. In a
sample of 308 children the 5- to 6-year-olds were significantly poorer on the faux pas test
than the 8- to 9-year-olds, as expected. Although the children performed well in identifying
that feelings had been hurt and in answering comprehension questions, they found three
questions relatively difficult: detecting the faux pas in the first place, seeing that the insult
was unintentional, and recognising the ignorance that led to the faux pas. Importantly, suc-
cess on the key questions of the faux pas task was negatively associated with peer rejection.
Rejected and controversial children, who receive relatively high numbers of negative so-
ciometric nominations from their classmates, performed significantly worse on this task than
other children. This pattern was evident only for the older age group. Results are discussed in
the light of recent research linking theory of mind performance with social adjustment.
Key words: Faux pas, Theory of mind, Peer relations.
3One of the most active and lively areas of research in developmental psychology over the
past two decades has centred on children’s understanding of mental states. The enormous in-
terest in this area was sharpened by findings that deficits in ‘theory of mind’ were associated
with autism, since they suggested a clear link between mental-state reasoning and social be-
haviour (e.g., Baron-Cohen, 1997; Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985). Alongside the work
on autism, many researchers have recently turned to theory of mind tasks as possible predic-
tors of variability in peer relations within the normally developing population (e.g., Peterson
& Siegal, 2002; Slaughter, Dennis, & Pritchard, 2002). In the course of this research, how-
ever, it has become clear that the most commonly used tests of theory of mind, which nor-
mally developing children usually pass by around 5 or 6 years of age, are inadequate meas-
ures of more complex mental-state understanding. High-functioning autistic (HFA) individu-
als and individuals with Asperger syndrome (AS) often do well on standard theory of mind
tasks (e.g., Dahlgren & Trillingsgaard, 1996), which therefore cannot account for the socio-
behavioural profiles of these groups. At the same time, within the normally developing
population, there is large variability in older school children’s social behaviour and peer rela-
tions that of course cannot be explained by their ceiling performance on standard theory of
mind tasks. The ‘faux pas’ task, developed originally by Baron-Cohen, O’Riordan, Stone,
Jones, and Plaisted (1999) and adapted by Banerjee (2000) and Banerjee and Henderson
(2001), is a more advanced theory of mind task. It requires insights into the mental states in-
volved in unintentional insults (e.g., criticising a painting without realising that you are talk-
ing to the person who painted it). The present study was designed to test the hypothesis that
performance on a new version of this task should be associated with peer relations in nor-
mally developing primary school children.
Baron-Cohen et al. (1999) presented the faux pas task as a new test of theory of mind
that tapped more advanced mental-state reasoning than standard tasks of false belief (e.g.,
4Baron-Cohen et al., 1985; Wimmer & Perner, 1983) and second-order false belief (e.g.,
Perner & Wimmer, 1985; Sullivan, Zaitchik, & Tager-Flusberg, 1994). Standard false belief
tasks require an insight into beliefs about (or beliefs about beliefs about) the identity or loca-
tion of physical objects. However, mental-state reasoning in naturalistic contexts is likely to
involve far more complex awareness of links among multiple mental states (e.g., intentions
and emotions as well as beliefs). Some tests using more naturalistic instances of non-literal
utterances, such as sarcasm and double-bluff, have been found to be difficult for individuals
with HFA or AS (Happe, 1994; Jolliffe & Baron-Cohen, 1999). This seems to be true of the
faux pas task too. In Baron-Cohen et al.’s (1999) paper introducing the faux pas task, evi-
dence from three studies suggested that performance on the task increases with age between 7
and 11 years within the normal population, and is less evident among children with AS or
HFA, even with samples of children who had all passed first-order and second-order false
belief tasks. Baron-Cohen et al.’s task required children to detect and identify faux pas in a
number of hypothetical vignettes, to answer a comprehension question about the faux pas,
and to identify the false belief (in fact, this was usually a state of ignorance) that led to the
faux pas.
The suggestion that faux pas tasks are a better measure of ‘naturalistic’ mental-state
reasoning than standard false belief tasks raises a central question, investigated in the present
study, of how important this kind of task may be in predicting specific social outcomes. The
basic premise that theory of mind performance should be linked to specific aspects of social
behaviour or peer relations within the normally developing population is not new. It seems
reasonable to expect a bi-directional association between theory of mind and positive peer
relations: an insight into others’ mental states should facilitate successful social interaction,
while at the same time one is likely to develop such insight through experiencing positive
peer interactions (Slaughter et al., 2002). However, most of the studies so far have focused on
5standard tests of belief and emotion understanding used with young children. A number of
recent studies, for example, have assessed associations between performance on false belief
tasks and peer acceptance. Slaughter et al. (2002) observed that 4- to 6-year-olds who were
rejected by their peers (as determined through sociometric nominations) performed worse on
theory of mind tasks, while Peterson and Siegal (2002) reported that popular 3- to 5-year-olds
were better on false belief tasks than their rejected counterparts. However, the findings are by
no means clear. In a second study reported by Slaughter et al. (2002), theory of mind scores
were not significantly associated with peer status, while Badenes, Estevan, and Bacete (2000)
found that peer-rejected 4- to 6-year-olds were similar to average children on several theory
of mind tasks. Part of the problem here is likely to be that the theory of mind tasks are simply
not tapping the (more advanced) everyday mental-state reasoning skills that underlie success-
ful peer relations. In any case, the standard belief and emotion understanding tasks would
have little predictive value for explaining social behaviour in older children.
The present study was designed to build on the progress made in the construction of
social understanding tasks in order to evaluate the role of advanced theory of mind as a cor-
relate of peer relations. There is already some evidence that advanced theory of mind is
linked to certain patterns of social behaviour in primary school children. Sutton, Smith, and
Swettenham (1999), for example, reported that bullies scored higher than victims did on a set
of 11 story tasks measuring complex belief and emotion understanding (including several
faux pas stories). However, a detailed assessment of links between advanced mental-state un-
derstanding and peer acceptance/rejection is lacking.
There is good reason to predict that faux pas understanding in particular would be asso-
ciated with positive peer relationships. Baron-Cohen et al. (1999) concluded their report by
saying that they considered their faux pas task to be a ‘‘first step towards creating methods
for assessing the use of a theory of mind in increasingly naturalistic social settings’’ (p. 415).
6It seems likely that the combined focus on knowledge states, intention, and emotion – and the
links between them – comes far closer to everyday ‘mindreading’ than standard false belief
tasks.  Two other studies involving an adaptation of the faux pas task provide further indica-
tion that the understanding of faux pas situations is likely to be associated with aspects of so-
cial adjustment. Banerjee (2000) demonstrated that children, who understood the uninten-
tional nature of the insult in the faux pas stories (after passing a series of control questions),
tended to better understand the value of modesty. They were more likely to see modest re-
sponses to praise (e.g., ‘‘I was just lucky’’) as leading to more positive social evaluation than
immodest responses (e.g., ‘‘I’m really clever’’). In addition, Banerjee (2000) showed that
faux pas scores were positively correlated with a measure of self-monitoring, whereby chil-
dren who reported monitoring and adjusting their social behaviour in response to situational
demands scored relatively highly on faux pas tasks. These findings are consistent with results
from Banerjee and Henderson (2001), whereby faux pas scores were inversely related to so-
cial anxiety and positively related (as part of a composite social cognition score) to teacher
ratings of sociability.
The research results discussed above set the scene for a large-scale assessment of the
relationship between faux pas task performance and peer acceptance/rejection. In particular,
if faux pas tasks really do tap everyday mental-state reasoning, higher performance should be
positively associated with peer acceptance. In the present study, we used sociometric peer
nomination techniques to identify children’s peer status. Based on procedures described by
Coie and Dodge (1983, 1988), children used a class photograph to identify three classmates
with whom they would really like to play and three classmates with whom they would really
not like to play. The standardised numbers of positive and negative nominations received
were used to generate scores of peer acceptance. They were also used to classify the children
as popular (high positive, low negative), rejected (low positive, high negative), controversial
7(high positive, high negative), neglected (low positive, low negative), or average (moderate
positive, moderate negative). Many research studies have demonstrated that children who are
popular and high on peer acceptance typically have more advanced social skills than children
who are rejected (see reviews by Gifford-Smith & Brownell, 2003; Newcomb, Bukowski, &
Pattee, 1993). Based on the argument set out earlier, we would expect corresponding differ-
ences in faux pas performance. Importantly, we will also explore whether any such effects of
peer status are due more to the heightened performance of Popular/Controversial children
(who receive relatively high numbers of positive nominations) or to the impaired perform-
ance of Rejected/Controversial children (who receive relatively high numbers of negative
nominations).
The present report concerns data from the first year of a three-year longitudinal study of
social cognition and peer relations in approximately 330 primary school children (from ages
5 to 8 years for one group, and ages 8 to 11 years for a second group). Children are seen once
a term, and they complete a battery of tasks in a 15- to 20-minute session using a multimedia
computer interface (detailed in Method section below). The particular variables of interest in
the present report are the faux pas scores, based on four stories with accompanying forced-
choice questions, and sociometric nominations. We expect to replicate previous findings that
performance on the faux pas task improves with age, so that the 8- to 9-year-olds should do
better than the 5- to 6-year-olds. More importantly, given the general expectation that theory
of mind should be associated with positive peer relations, we expect children who do well on
the faux pas task to be higher on peer acceptance. We hypothesise that these associations
should be particularly evident for the faux pas questions tapping the more complex reasoning
processes. These processes are the following: (a) To recognise that the insult was uninten-
tional (e.g., X did not want to upset Y when X criticised Y’s painting); (b) To recognise that
8the character who made the faux pas was ignorant about some key aspect of the situation
(e.g., X did not know that Y had painted the picture).
Method
Participants
The children whose data are reported here are two cohorts participating in an ongoing
three-year longitudinal study in a city in the south of England. They were from five Year 1
and seven Year 4 classrooms in seven primary/junior schools that had agreed to participate in
this Local Education Authority-sponsored project. The children were all aged 5-6 (Year 1) or
8-9 (Year 4) years at the commencement of the project, and the data reported here are from
the second term of that first academic year. A total of 308 had received peer nominations and
had completed the faux pas task. Of these 308 children, 54 boys and 59 girls were in Year 1
(mean age: 6.02 years; SD = .39) and 111 boys and 84 girls were in Year 4 (mean age: 9.01
years; SD = .29).
Materials
Children completed all tasks using a multimedia computer interface designed and cre-
ated by the authors using Runtime Revolution software. All responses were made by using a
mouse to click on on-screen buttons, and all text on the screen (e.g., instructions, stories,
questions, response options etc.) was read out loud to the child via headphones. The tasks
were presented on PCs running Windows 95, 98, or 2000 in the schools’ computer laborato-
ries.
9Measures
At each time point of the longitudinal study, children completed a battery of measures
using the multimedia computer interface.1 The two measures reported here are described be-
low:
Faux Pas: Children were told (orally and through on-screen text) that they would hear
four different stories, that they should listen carefully to the stories, and that they would be
asked some questions at the end of each story. They then were presented with four faux pas
stories in random order, each followed by six forced-choice questions in a fixed order. A sin-
gle cartoon-style illustration accompanied each story, and all instructions, story text, ques-
tions, and response options were presented orally. Each story involved two child story char-
acters where the ‘insulting’ character makes an unintentional insult about some target object
and a neutral statement is made by the ‘insulted’ character. The insulting character was al-
ways ignorant with respect to the insulted character’s relationship with the target object. For
example, in one story, one character says a painting is awful to a second character, not real-
ising that he was the person who had painted it. The order in which the faux pas and neutral
statements appeared was counterbalanced across stories. The six forced-choice questions are
listed below, with the correct answer identified in italics.
DETECTION – In the story, did someone say something they should not have said?
(Yes or No)
IDENTIFICATION – What was said that should not have been said? ([insult by in-
sulting character] or [neutral statement by insulted character])
FEELINGS – How does [insulted character] feel now? (Happy/Pleased or Sad/Upset)
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INTENTION – Did [insulting character] want to make [insulted character] upset? (Yes
or No)
COMPREHENSION – [question regarding target object] (Correct answer or Incorrect
answer)
IGNORANCE – Did [insulting character] know [insulted character’s relationship with
the target object]? (Yes or No)
The order of correct and incorrect response options was counterbalanced across sto-
ries2, but the six questions were presented in a fixed order after each story.  The first two and
the last two questions correspond to the four questions listed in Baron-Cohen et al. (1999),
with the exception that forced-choice response options were presented to the children.  Two
stories involved a male character making the faux pas and two stories involved a female
character making the faux pas.  A sample story and question set is presented in the Appendix.
Peer status: Children were presented with a class photograph and the following in-
structions (presented orally and in on-screen text):
Please click on the faces of three children in your class who you would really like
to play with.  Then click on the green “OK” button to go on.  If you change your
mind, click on the red “Start Again” button.
A black oval ring ‘button’ surrounded each face on the screen and when the mouse-
controlled pointer was moved over each ring the child would hear the name of the corre-
sponding child. When a face was clicked, the corresponding name would appear in a space
near the bottom of the screen and the button around that face was disabled. Children could
clear the selection and start over at any point by clicking on a red ‘Start Again’ button. If
fewer than three nominations were made, the child received an alert which gave him or her
the choice of either completing three nominations or of skipping to the next task. After mak-
ing the positive nominations and clicking on a green ‘OK’ button to indicate completion,
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children saw the same class photograph but this time were asked to click on the faces of three
children with whom they would really not like to play. Children were prevented from nomi-
nating themselves (their own ‘button’ was disabled), but were free to nominate classmates of
either sex.
Procedure
Children completed the task in groups of between 3 and 7 (with smaller groups for the
younger children). Each child was seated at a computer in the school’s computer laboratory,
spaced apart from other children as much as possible. They were given a general introduction
to the tasks, and then donned the headphones and clicked on the Start button on the first
screen to commence the task. Research assistants who provided help when needed supervised
them. Few problems were reported, and all children were familiar with the use of the mouse
button. All tasks were presented in a random order (which, along with the use of headphones,
helped to preserve individual privacy), and children completed the battery of tasks in a ses-
sion usually lasting between 10 and 20 minutes, although there were no time limits on any
task.
Scoring
Faux Pas. Consistent with Baron-Cohen et al. (1999), children had to answer all ques-
tions for a story correctly in order to pass that story (scoring 1 point). Thus, correct answers
to all 24 questions in the task would lead to a faux pas score of 4. Since there were two re-
sponse options for each of six questions, the probability of passing a story by random guess-
ing is very low (.016; across four stories, .06). In addition to this overall score, children re-
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ceived ‘question scores’ out of four for each of the six questions. This allowed an analysis of
which questions were relatively difficult or easy for the children. Since each question was
answered by selecting one of two alternatives, chance responding would lead to a score of 2
for each of the six question scores.
Peer status. Three steps were involved, based on Coie and Dodge (1983, 1988). First,
the numbers of positive/like (L) and negative/dislike (D) nominations received by each par-
ticipant were standardised within each classroom. Second, the difference between those stan-
dardised scores was used to create a ‘social preference’ (SP) score, and the sum of the same
standardised scores was used to create a ‘social impact’ (SI) score. Finally, the social prefer-
ence and social impact scores were themselves standardised within classroom and used along
with the standardised L and D scores to allocate children to five peer status group categories:
Popular (SP > 1, L > 0, D < 0). Rejected (SP < -1, L < 0, D > 0). Controversial (SI > 1, L > 0,
D > 0). Neglected (SI < -1, L < 0, D < 0), and Average (-1 < SP < 1 and –1 < SI < 1).
This resulted in successful classification of all but five of the 308 children, as follows:
Popular: n = 40, mean absolute number of negative nominations (Mnegative) = .65, mean abso-
lute number of positive nominations (Mpositive) = 6.38. Rejected: n = 40, Mnegative = 8.20, Mpositive
= .88. Controversial: n = 18, Mnegative = 7.06, Mpositive = 4.72. Neglected: n = 48, Mnegative = .85,
Mpositive = 1.08). Average: n = 157, Mnegative 2.11, M positive 2.93. This distribution was similar
for each age group, χ2(4, N = 303) = 1.52, p = .82, and gender, χ2(4, N = 303) = 5.95, p = .21.
Results
Faux pas
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We performed an analysis of variance on the overall faux pas scores (number of stories
passed, out of a maximum 4), with age group and sex as the between-subjects variables. This
showed only a significant main effect of age group, F(1, 304) = 88.35, p < .001, partial η2 =
.23. An inspection of data from the entire sample showed that the younger children scored
significantly lower than the older children, M = .93, SD = 1.27, and M = 2.44, SD = 1.41, re-
spectively. However, one-sample t-tests for each age group separately showed that these
scores were significantly above the chance value of .06 (.016 per story * 4 stories): younger
group, t(112) = 7.26, p < .001; older group, t(194) = 23.52, p < .001. Further analysis of story
effects showed only that one of the stories – where one character says he hates apple pie to
someone who has just made him one – was generally passed less often than the other three
(Cochran’s Q, p < .001; pass rate 40% vs. 50% for the remaining stories).
Analysis of performance on individual questions (scores out of a maximum of 4)
showed that both age groups scored above chance (2) on all questions, with the exception of
the initial detection of the faux pas, where the younger children scored at chance, M = 2.15
SD = 1.60, t(112) = 1.00, p = .32; all other t > 6.43, p < .001. However, it is clear that three
questions – identification, feelings, and comprehension – were generally easier than the oth-
ers, with the younger age group scoring on average at least 3.30 out of 4 on each of these
items, and the older age group scoring at ceiling level (> 3.86 on each). In contrast, the other
three items – detection, intention, and ignorance – were relatively difficult, with younger
children scoring below 3 on these and older children below 3.6 on these. This pattern is illus-
trated in Figure 1.
--------------------------
Figure 1 about here
---------------------------
Faux pas and peer status
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Our next analysis considered associations between the overall faux pas scores and the
sociometric measures (standardised positive nominations, standardised negative nominations,
social preference scores, and social impact scores). Table 1 shows the Pearson correlation
coefficients for these associations, both for the whole sample and for each age group sepa-
rately. Overall, faux pas understanding was positively associated with social preference
scores. However, Table 1 shows that two qualifications must be made: First, these associa-
tions are evidently due more to negative correlations with the standardised number of nega-
tive peer nominations than to positive correlations with positive nominations. Second, the
significant correlations noted above, along with a marginally significant negative association
with social impact scores, are present only for the older age group. Furthermore, the pattern
of correlations within each age group remained virtually unchanged after controlling for age.
Finally, discounting scores for faux pas stories where the comprehension question was failed
made virtually no difference to the pattern of correlations.
----------------------------
Table 1 about here
----------------------------
The link between faux pas and peer acceptance is confirmed in analysis of peer status
group differences on faux pas performance. Following preliminary analyses of variance
showing a significant effect of peer status for the older group only: older group, F(4, 189) =
2.91, p < .025, partial η2 = .06, and younger group, F(4, 104) = 0.64, p = .63, planned con-
trasts of each extreme sociometric group against the average group showed that rejected and
controversial 8- to 9-year-olds were significantly lower on faux pas performance: rejected vs.
average t(189) = 2.59, p = .01; controversial vs. average t(189) =  2.46, p < .02; popular vs.
average t(189) = 0.55, p = .55; neglected vs. average t(189) = 0.20, p = .85. The correspond-
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ing mean scores are shown in Table 2. The lower mean scores of the controversial and re-
jected children are consistent with the correlations of faux pas scores with social preference,
social impact, and standardised negative nominations discussed above. Specifically, rejected
children are low on social preference and high on negative nominations, while controversial
children are high on social impact and high on negative nominations. Interestingly, further
analysis suggested that the poorer performance of the rejected children was especially true of
the rejected boys, while the poorer performance of the controversial children was especially
true of the controversial girls.
-------------------------
Table 2 about here
--------------------------
Our final analysis examined whether certain faux pas questions were responsible for
the above associations in the older age group. Because of concerns about the uneven distri-
bution of scores on the individual ‘question scores’, we divided children into those scoring 3
or 4 and those scoring below 3. Given the almost universally high performance on the three
‘easy’ questions (only 5 or fewer of the 195 children scored below 3 out of 4 on these), this
distinction could not account for variability in peer acceptance/rejection. However, as shown
in Table 3, performance on two of the ‘difficult’ questions – intention, and ignorance – was
significantly associated with social preference (reflecting negative associations with negative
nominations). The children who scored below 3 out of 4 received significantly more negative
nominations and thus had significantly lower social preference scores. Consistent with this,
rejected and controversial children – the peer status groups with relatively high levels of
negative peer nominations – were together more than twice as likely as the other peer status
groups to have low intention and low ignorance scores: 30% of rejected/controversial chil-
dren scored low on intention, in comparison with 12% of other children, χ2(1, N = 194) =
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7.86, p = .005, while 35% of rejected/controversial children scored low on ignorance in com-
parison with 17% of other children, χ2(1, N = 194) = 5.89, p < .02.
--------------------------
Table 3 about here
---------------------------
Discussion
The results reported above confirm previous findings that children’s detection and un-
derstanding of faux pas improve with age (Banerjee, 2000; Baron-Cohen et al., 1999). In
particular, although performance on individual questions tended to be high, correct responses
to all six questions following a faux pas story were found on average in less than one story
out of four for the younger age group, in comparison with over two stories for the 8- to 9-
year-olds. The distribution of errors across questions was uneven, however. Children very
rarely failed to identify the faux pas statement when directly asked, to recognise that the in-
sulted character was upset/sad, or to answer the comprehension question correctly. The errors
were much more likely to appear on the initial detection of faux pas, the recognition that the
upset was not intentional, and/or the appreciation of the ignorance that led to the faux pas.
Critically, the variability in faux pas scores was associated with variability in children’s
peer relations. Children with higher social preference scores (i.e., more preferred by their
classmates) tended to perform better on the faux pas test, and in particular on the intention
and ignorance questions. Furthermore, it seemed clear that this association was due not so
much to the elevated performance of popular children (who are liked more than average by
their classmates) as to the poor performance of rejected and controversial children (who are
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disliked more than average by their classmates). Finally, and intriguingly, it seemed that
these associations were present only in the older age group.
Turning first to the differences between faux pas questions, we are in a better position
now to explain the previously observed developmental lag between passing standard false
belief tasks and succeeding on faux pas tasks (see Banerjee, 2000; Baron-Cohen et al., 1999).
The results show that, as hypothesised, the questions about the lack of intention and the
knowledge state that led to the faux pas are indeed the most significant aspects of the task.
Even 5- to 6-year-old children are usually able to pick out the faux pas statement (rather than
the neutral statement) when directly asked, and can see the negative consequence of the insult
for the insulted character’s feelings. The challenging aspects of the task concern the higher-
order reasoning required to infer that the upset had not been intended, and the awareness of
the faulty knowledge state that was responsible for the faux pas. Furthermore, it is the vari-
ability on these aspects of the task that is associated with sociometric status scores. Returning
to the claims that the faux pas task measures more ‘naturalistic’ mental-state reasoning, we
suggest that it is the tracking of multiple, linked mental states that lies at the heart of every-
day folk psychology. Furthermore, these mental states often relate to intangible entities in
social life: the faux pas stories involved beliefs/knowledge about past events and characters’
psychological preferences, in contrast to the beliefs about physical object identity and loca-
tion that are typically the concern of standard belief tasks.
Further research is still needed in order to specify whether other less naturalistic tasks
with higher levels of complexity (e.g., standard second-order false-belief tasks) show similar
associations with social relations3. However, there is good evidence from other strands of
theory of mind research that the naturalistic qualities identified above – related to the tracking
of multiple mental states in the context of social interactions – can help to explain the relative
difficulty of the faux pas task. First, children’s understanding of linkages among different
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mental states tends to appear later in development, in comparison with the understanding of
those mental states in isolation. For example, children’s appreciation of the emotional conse-
quences of beliefs and desires continues to develop for several years beyond success on sim-
pler belief and desire tasks (e.g., Ruffman & Keenan, 1996; Yuill, Perner, Pearson,
Peerhbhoy, and van den Ende, 1996). In addition, moving on to the issue regarding the refer-
ents of the mental states, children’s performance on a ‘social’ version of the false belief task
involving beliefs about story characters’ play activities was found by Nguyen and Frye
(1999) to lag behind their performance on a standard ‘physical’ false belief task. We suggest
that these kinds of issues are likely to be responsible for shaping developmental trends in
faux pas understanding. The fact that the questions about intention and ignorance are the ones
responsible for the associations with sociometric status support our suggestion that these
questions are tapping abilities and processes used in everyday reasoning. Importantly, other
naturalistic tasks (e.g., that tap the understanding of irony and sarcasm) may also be success-
ful in predicting variability in peer relations, and further research on this topic is clearly
needed.
In our report on the data analysis, we qualified our observation of the overall link
between faux pas scores and sociometric preference by noting that the association was ex-
plained more by the negative peer nominations – higher in rejected and controversial children
– than by the positive peer nominations. Also, we demonstrated that the significant relation-
ships were only found among the older children. These qualifications raise important and un-
resolved issues. First, although it is entirely reasonable to expect that an impaired under-
standing of faux pas would be found among children who are disliked by their classmates
more often than average, it is unclear why heightened faux pas performance is not associated
with increased positive reactions from peers. In order to address this ambiguity, we must link
faux pas understanding to the more immediate, socio-behavioural characteristics – such as
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aggression, withdrawal, and sociability – that are typically seen as major predictors of peer
acceptance and rejection (Newcomb et al., 1993). For example, perhaps the most important
area of overlap in the behavioural profiles of rejected and controversial children is their high
scores on measures of aggressive behaviour, and we can speculate that poorer faux pas un-
derstanding is associated with negative sociometric nominations precisely because it leads to
more aggression. Longstanding evidence has shown that hostile attribution biases are more
common in aggressive children (Dodge, 1980; Dodge & Frame, 1982), and since faux pas
stories involve unintentional insults that are a commonplace feature of everyday life, a poorer
understanding of these kinds of situations should be associated with increased aggression.
Importantly, although faux pas performance is not concurrently associated with positive peer
nominations, we should leave open the possibility that better faux pas understanding may, in
time, also lead to increased sociability and, thereby, to increased peer acceptance.
On the other hand, we must also recognise that performance on the faux pas task may
be the consequence, as well as the cause, of peer acceptance/rejection. If we assume that
positive peer interactions are an important context for the development of social skills (see
Asher & Coie, 1990) we can speculate that negative peer experiences, likely to be experi-
enced by (and provoked by the aggression of) rejected and controversial children, may make
it difficult for children to acquire advanced mental-state reasoning skills. Interestingly, it ap-
pears that the neglected status is not associated with difficulty on the faux pas task. This
finding is consistent with broader lines of evidence that children with this peer status classi-
fication are not likely to be at risk of developmental difficulties (see Newcomb et al., 1993).
Thus, it is likely to be the presence of highly negative social relations rather than the absence
of highly positive social relations that is associated with difficulty on the faux pas task.
We must also acknowledge the possibility that other factors – besides aggressive be-
haviour and hostile attribution biases – may account for the associations between negative
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peer experiences and difficulty on the faux pas task. First, we need to be more specific about
the socio-behavioural characteristics that are associated with faux pas performance; some
particular forms of aggression and/or prosocial behaviour may be more relevant than others
are. In addition, there are likely to be close links with emotional characteristics, such as so-
cial anxiety (e.g., Banerjee & Henderson, 1999). Finally, given evidence that language com-
petence is associated with performance on theory of mind tasks (e.g., Astington & Jenkins,
1999; also see Baron-Cohen et al., 1999) along with observed links between peer rejection
and academic difficulties (see Gifford-Smith & Brownell, 2003), the contribution of general
cognitive and linguistic abilities to associations between peer status and faux pas under-
standing must also be addressed in further research.
A further, related issue concerns the fact that associations between faux pas and so-
ciometric scores were found only among the older children. We can speculate that the ad-
vanced mental-state reasoning tapped by the faux pas task is of greater significance in the
older children than in the younger children. Whereas young children’s friendships relate pri-
marily to companionship and common play interests, the peer relations of the 8- to 9-year-
olds are likely to revolve around psychological dynamics of social evaluation in relation to
peer group norms (e.g., see Bigelow & la Gaipa, 1975; Parker & Gottman, 1989). In the latter
context, an insight into multiple mental states (including unintentional insults in particular)
may be of central importance in the maintenance of positive – or avoidance of negative –
peer relations. Indeed, our evidence suggests that whereas younger children share common
difficulties with faux pas reasoning, an older child with such difficulties may well experience
problems in interacting with his or her more sophisticated peers. Thus, although of course it
remains possible and even probable that simpler mental-state reasoning tasks may be associ-
ated with aspects of younger children’s social relations, faux pas understanding may assume
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greater significance as a predictor of social behaviour and peer relations as children increase
in age.
In summary, the present study has demonstrated that responses to faux pas stories are
indeed an effective and useful index of social understanding that relates to ‘real-life’ social
outcomes. However, longitudinal analyses are clearly needed to address the outstanding is-
sues discussed above, most particularly with regard to the causal direction of associations
between faux pas understanding and social outcomes. Such analyses would build on the pre-
liminary findings of links between faux pas performance and peer rejection found here, by
identifying more precisely the role played by social-cognitive abilities in the developmental
trajectories of children’s everyday social life.
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Footnotes
1 These measures related to peer relations (loneliness, peer status, and a class play ac-
tivity), emotional characteristics (social anxiety, depressive symptoms), self-perception, and
social cognition (including the faux pas task).
2 This was not true for the first, fourth, and sixth questions, where Yes and No response
buttons remained in fixed positions in accordance with a standard presentation of these but-
tons in other tasks in the battery.
3 A pilot version of Sullivan et al.’s (1994) second-order false-belief task was in fact
administered as part of the test battery at this timepoint. Passing this task was positively cor-
related with social preference, but this effect disappeared after controlling for performance on
the faux pas task. In contrast, the faux pas scores remained significantly correlated with so-
cial preference among the older children after controlling for the second-order false-belief
task performance.
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Appendix
Sample faux pas story and questions
Nick has painted a picture of a rocket for a class exhibition. Nick’s friend, Peter, is in
another class, but he comes to see the exhibition after school. Peter points to Nick’s picture
and says, ‘‘The rest of the paintings are quite nice, but this rocket picture is dreadful, isn't
it?’’ Nick says, ‘‘Oh, I need to go home now.’’
Detection: In the story, did someone say something they should not have said? Yes OR No
Identification: What was said that should not have been said? Nick said, ‘‘I need to go home
now’’ OR Peter said, ‘‘This rocket picture is dreadful’’
Feelings: How does Nick feel now? Sad OR Pleased
Intention: Did Peter want to make Nick upset? Yes OR No
Comprehension: Who painted the rocket picture? Nick painted it OR Someone else painted
it
Ignorance: Did Peter know that Nick had painted the rocket picture? Yes OR No
Other scenarios: one character says curtains are horrible to person who has just bought them;
one character says he hates apple pie to cousin who has just made one; one character is nega-
tive about violins to friend who has just started violin lessons.
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Figure 1.  Mean scores on each of the six faux pas questions, by age group.
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Table 1.  Pearson correlations between faux pas scores and sociometric scores, by age group.
Social
preference
Social
impact
Standardised positive
nominations
Standardised negative
nominations
Age 5-6 years .08 -.04 .04 -.09
Age 8-9 years .20** -.13+ .09 -.23***
Total .13* -.07 .06 -.15**
Note: + p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001.
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Table 2.  Mean (SD) faux pas scores of younger and older children, by peer status classifica-
tion.
Popular Rejected Controversial Neglected Average
Age 5-6 years 1.19 (1.28) 0.77 (0.83) 0.75 (1.49) 1.27 (1.53) 0.81 (1.26)
Age 8-9 years 2.46 (1.14) 1.85 (1.59) 1.50 (1.43) 2.58 (1.37) 2.63 (1.38)
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Table 3. Mean (SD) sociometric scores of children scoring high and low on intention and ig-
norance questions (8-9 year age group only)
Social
preference
Standardised positive
nominations
Standardised negative
nominations
Faux pas – Intention
Low (< 3 out of 4), n = 29 -.86 (1.74) -.26 (.78)  .60 (1.33)
High (> 3 out of 4), n = 166  .15** (1.55)  .06 (1.01) -.10** (.88)
Faux pas – Ignorance
Low (< 3 out of 4), n = 40 -.58 (1.76) -.19 (.97)  .38 (1.22)
High (> 3 out of 4), n = 155  .15** (1.54)  .06 (.99) -.09* (.90)
Note: Asterisk(s) indicate high vs. low t-test significant at * p < .05 or ** p < .01
